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Critical realism and creativity  
A Challenge to the Hegemony of Psychological Conceptions 
Abstract 
Humanist thought has long considered the nature of creativity in workers but the 
dominant framework for conceptualising creativity, rooted in psychological theory, 
has provided inadvertent limits on who might be considered creative at work. This is 
because creativity is commonly defined through the recognition of produced and 
valued novelty. This definition obscures all that is unrecognised, unrealised, 
unexercised, and currently in potential from being considered as creativity. Given that 
creativity can sometimes exist in potential, and that some workers have their 
creativity actively prevented from being recognised, researching and understanding 
the unrecognised creative person can be seen as an important goal for humanist 
scholars. The goal of this paper then is to unpick the contradiction between 
unrecognised creativity and dominant definitions of creativity in order to enable a 
deeper understanding of creativity at work. The paper proceeds with an immanent 
critique of the dominant framework and its definition of creativity, before proposing a 
critical realist inspired ontology of creativity, including an augmented definition of 
creativity. The consequences of this research for understanding creativity in 
organisations are briefly reflected upon. 
Introduction 
Within the social sciences there seems to be growing interest in human creativity. At 
the same time, there is a long tradition of humanist thought that has always placed the 
issue of creativity, and particularly its absence, close to the centre of its analysis. 
Humanists of various shades have long enquired why, if to be human is to engage in 
creative work, human creativity sometimes rarely manifests in the workplace.  So 1
there are both new and old traditions placing, and keeping, creativity on the 
intellectual radar screen. This humanist tradition has guided my research on the 
sometimes forgotten creative workers, those whose creativity remains unrecognised 
and/or unrealised.  
Investigating the unrecognised and unrealised creativity of workers in organisations 
reveals that the dominant conceptual framework for creativity studies can preclude 
these categories of people from being considered creative. This dominant framework 
is typified by research published in journals that focus entirely on creativity, such as 
the Creativity Research Journal, but extends to research in the specialist publications 
of organisational research, psychology, management science and human resource 
management. Within this framework, creativity is commonly defined as the 
recognised production of something useful, appropriate and novel. There are 
variations on this definition, for example the recognised production of valued novelty 
or adaptive novelty, but each has similar meaning. These definitions presuppose that 
 E.g. Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society 1
(Cambridge: CUP, , 1976) and Itsvan Mészáros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation (London: Merlin 
Press, 1975). 
for an act to be classed as creative it has to both be recognised as creative, a corollary 
of which is that creativity can not exist unrecognised; and be actualised, a corollary of 
which is that creativity can not exist in an unrealised state;  and further that, to the 
extent that creativity is considered to exist as a potential (and this is an ambiguous 
consideration at best), it can only be inferred through its manifestation in creative 
performance.  
It seems then that the humanist tradition, which considers workers as having the 
power to be creative even if they are not acting as such, is in conflict with this 
conventional definition of creativity. An exploration and critique of the conventional 
definition of creativity seems necessary to, in effect, rescue humanist thought from the 
theories of creativity developed within this dominant framework, which inadvertently 
preclude the unrecognised and unrealised from consideration. In what follows I 
present an immanent critique of the conventional definition and suggest that the 
tensions within the psychological creativity literature that have led to neglect of the 
unrecognised and unrealised can be reduced when the principles of critical realism are 
used to inform research. The critique begins with an overview of the dominant 
conceptual framework and the conventional definition of creativity within it. It 
suggests that reliance on recognition and problems with the concept of novelty have 
led to difficulties that creativity researchers have so far struggled to overcome. An 
augmented conceptual framework of human creativity, consistent with the principles 
of critical realism, is then proposed, and the implications of this for understanding 
creativity at work is briefly discussed. The new framework suggests that discovery 
rather than novelty is an important defining feature of creativity, and the significance 
of this is considered.  2
 Bhaskar’s work on creativity is not considered part of the dominant conceptual framework 2
so a critique of it will not be offered. However, its relevance to the proposed augmented 
conceptual framework will be explored later. 
The Dominant Conceptual Framework 
The dominant conceptual framework for creativity research has been heavily 
influenced by psychological research.  This has led to four broad areas of research 3
interest: research that has as its focus the creative person,  the creative product,  the 4 5
creative process,  and creative systems.  Whilst diverse theoretical accounts of 6 7
creativity have emerged, common to them is the conventional definition of creativity 
based on the recognised production of appropriate novelty. This form of definition 
was proposed as a pragmatic stop-gap because creativity was regarded as difficult to 
define. This enabled researchers to continue empirical work on creativity with the 
simple premise that they could ‘know it when they see it’.  However, despite the 8
underlying tensions being unresolved, the definition has survived and is now largely 
accepted without reflection. 
This has inevitably restricted the type of research conducted and the subsequent 
theories of creativity proposed. For example, research on creative people initially 
explored those individuals who were considered undoubtedly creative, often referred 
to as having genius-level creativity (Nobel Prize winners, international authors and so 
on). Measures of their personality type, motivation and cognitive processes were 
explored and norms established for the selected groups. In the workplace, it is 
assumed that employees can also be tested and their characteristics compared to the 
norms of the ‘genius’ sample.  These tests are seen as measures of an individual’s 9
likelihood of being creative in the future or their creative potential. As research 
developed, genius samples were no longer thought necessary, as the criteria for 
creative performance had supposedly been established. However, it has been noted 
that this created a selection bias in creativity theorising as only those who actualise 
 For evidence of this, see Roisin Donnelly, ‘Fostering creativity within an imaginative 3
curriculum in higher education’, The Curriculum Journal 15(2) (2004): 155-66.
 E.g. Gregory Feist, ‘A meta-analysis of personality in scientific and artistic creativity’, 4
Personality and Social Psychology Review 2(4 ) (1998): 290-309.
 E.g. Beth Henessey and Teresa Amabile, ‘Consensual Assessment’, in The Encyclopedia of 5
Creativity: Volume I, eds. Mark Runco and Steven Pritzker, London: Academic Press, 1999, 
347-359. 
 E.g. Margaret Boden, The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (London: Routledge, 6
2004).
 E.g. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and 7
Invention (London: Harper Collins 1996).
 For a review of this logic see Teresa Amabile, Creativity in Context (Oxford: Westview 8
Press,1996).
 E.g. Jonathan Plucker and Joseph Renzulli, ‘Psychometric approaches to the study of 9
human creativity’, in Handbook of Creativity, ed. Robert Sternberg (Cambridge: CUP, 
1999), 42-4.
their creativity were examined for the components of creative potential.  This can 10
lead to a tendency within theory to assume that only a small percentage of the 
population have the potential to achieve such creativity, and this risks providing fuel 
to those who advocate elitist ideas and policies. This issue has also influenced, albeit 
with a different emphasis, approaches to understanding creative processes, products 
and systems. 
All creativity research within this dominant framework explicitly or implicitly relies 
on the recognition of the creative act in some form. Some researchers take this further 
by arguing that recognition of the creative act is more than just a research facilitator, it 
ultimately defines creativity. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi,  for example, claims that ‘if 11
creativity is to retain meaning it must refer to a process that results in an idea or 
product that is recognised and adopted by others … without some form of public 
recognition they do not constitute creativity’. Clearly, the role of recognition needs 
unpicking, especially as this research seems to depend on a form of the epistemic 
fallacy Roy Bhaskar has identified, whereby the ontological components of creativity 
are collapsed into the epistemological apparatus of researchers, in this case the 
recognition of the creative act.  
Is recognition essential to a definition of creativity?  
Clearly recognition is important to creativity, which cannot effect far-reaching change 
without it. However, is it necessary to argue that creativity is meaningless without 
recognition? If the answer is yes, research on unrecognised creativity would appear 
problematic, as would some of the claims within the humanist tradition. If the answer 
is no, then perhaps an alternative definition is required for research to progress. 
Whilst critical realism can offer a route to understanding the existence of creativity 
prior to its recognition, it is first important to ask whether the philosophies of science 
underpinning existing creativity research can also provide sustainable answers. The 
answer, it seems, is no. 
On the one hand, research is informed by, in broadly defined terms, empirical realism 
or positivism. This form of research, with its focus on studying only the empirical 
requires creativity to be seen or recognised in order for it to be suitable for empirical 
investigation. It is perfectly consistent with this approach to define creativity in terms 
of its recognition. Yet Marc Runco  acknowledges that this creates a problem when 12
considering how we come to know creative potential, which is by definition prior to 
 Mark Runco, ‘Commentary on personal and potentially ambiguous creativity: you can’t 10
understand the butterfly unless you (also) watch the caterpillar’, Creativity Research 
Journal 15(2 and 3) (2003): 140.
 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, ‘Implications of a systems perspective for the study of 11
creativity’, in Handbook of Creativity, ed. Sternberg, (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 314.
 Mark Runco, ‘Commentary’, 138.12
recognition. His position is to accept that creative potential exists but to claim that it 
is only after it is manifest that we discover whether the potential existed in the first 
place. He realises that in terms of the philosophy of science used to inform his 
research this can cause difficulties:  
  
I am fully aware that my position on potential does not lend itself to an entirely objective 
science. However, it may be that we have to modify our methods such that they aren’t 
maximally objective but are as objective as possible and still cover the topic at hand, namely, 
creativity.  
However, although he recognises the tension, he does not deal with it. The temporary 
suspension of objectivity does not necessarily reconcile empirical realism with 
creative potential. The emphasis on empirical data and the lack of a conception of 
potential within his meta-theory has left Runco in a position whereby he recognises 
the importance of potential but his attempts to explain it are obstructed by the 
epistemological assumptions held about how we come to know it. How he comes to 
theorise creative potential is therefore restricted not by theoretical issues but by 
deeper meta-theoretical problems.  
On the other hand, creativity research has been informed by a poststructural or 
postmodern perspective. Although there are exceptions, those who operate from 
within this broadly defined meta-theoretical perspective tend to prioritise 
epistemology. Whilst considering epistemology is, of course, perfectly acceptable, 
there is also a tendency within these approaches to commit the epistemic fallacy. 
There seems to be a chain of argument that runs as follows: We start off asking ‘What 
exists?’ We then recognise that to gain knowledge of what exists we have to access it 
via our linguistic or discursive apparatus. Then an unwarranted step can follow 
whereby the conclusion is drawn that, because knowledge of what exists is mediated 
by our linguistic or discursive practises, social reality becomes something that is 
entirely constructed through such practises. In creativity research, the moment of 
recognition can sometimes be regarded in this light. For these researchers, it is 
therefore perfectly consistent to define creativity through its recognition and to 
subsequently, and inadvertently, ignore questions of creative potential and 
unrecognised creativity in their research. 
Steve Fleetwood  demonstrates this form of reasoning in the work of Kenneth 13
Gergen,  Robert Chia  and Karl Weick  within the field of management and 14 15 16
organisational analysis, and similar examples can be seen within creativity studies. 
 Steve Fleetwood, ‘The ontology of organisation and management studies: a critical 13
realist approach’, Organization 12(2) (2005): 197-22.
 Kenneth Gergen and Tojo Thatchenkery, ‘Organizational science in a postmodern 14
context’, in The Realm of Organization: Essays for Robert Cooper, ed. R. Chia (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
 Robert Chia and Ian King, ‘The language of organization theory’, in The Language of 15
Organizations, eds R. Westwood and S. Linstead (London: Sage 2001), 217-240.
 Karl Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (London: Sage 1995). 16
For instance, Tudor Richards, drawing upon Weick’s analysis,  discusses the 17
situational approach to creativity studies and claims: 
A liberating aspect of Amabile’s  work is that it steps away from the search for an ultimate 18
criterion of creativity … the pragmatic point is that social reality is strongly determined by the 
beliefs of those considered most informed.  19
Later in the article, when discussing the difficulties in defining creative organisations, 
Richards suggests that the problems in doing this can be overcome merely by 
discussing companies ‘interested in creativity’, stating that this  ‘paradigm switch 
effectively shifts attention to creativity as a socially constructed phenomenon’.  20
Similarly, when discussing creativity and innovation,  Richards draws on Peter 21
Winch  and claims that to understand what constitutes social reality (in this case 22
creativity and innovation), we are required to understand the concept of social reality.  
So in both forms of research there is little within the philosophy of science 
underpinning it to suggest a problem when defining creativity in terms of its 
recognition. The investigation of creativity that is unrecognised, unrealised or 
currently in potential has therefore remained either excluded from psychological 
research or hampered by the conventional definition and dominant conceptual 
framework as, arguably, they appear inconsistent with it. Whilst it is important to 
establish the role of recognition in creativity, it is equally important to establish how 
creativity can exist prior to and independently of recognition. To establish this, it is 
first necessary to tackle the issue that led creativity researchers to suggest that 
‘knowing it when we see it’ is the only sustainable approach to defining creativity. 
That, I argue, is the issue of understanding novelty. 
 Weick, Sensemaking.17
 Amabile, Creativity in Context.18
 Tudor Richards, ‘Assessing organisational creativity: an innovative benchmarking 19
approach’, International Journal of Innovation Management 2(3) (1998): 367-82, 370.
 Ibid., 371.20
 Tudor Richards, ‘The management of innovation: recasting the role of creativity’, 21
European Journal of Work and Organisational Psychology 5(1) (1996): 13-27, 16.
 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: 22
Routledge 1990).
De novo or ex nihilo? The problem of novelty 
Novelty, the existence of something for the first time and distinct from other moments 
and things in existence, has proven problematic for creativity researchers to explain. 
If novelty is de novo, the recombination of previously existing things, it is difficult to 
separate creative novelty from all other novel moments. If we wish to maintain that 
there is something new and distinctive in creative novelty, a form of ex nihilo 
creation, creation from nothing, can be smuggled into the definition of novelty. This 
last point is especially true if an adequate understanding of potential is lacking from 
the philosophy of science underpinning the definition.  Both these positions have 23
troubled creativity researchers. The solutions offered to date have failed to remove 
these tensions and, arguably, resulted in the continuing need to rely on recognition as 
the ultimate defining feature of creativity. Taking each of these problems in turn, 
Robert Epstein  provides an excellent summary of the problems for creativity 24
researchers if novelty is conceived of as de novo: 
The behaviour of organisms has many firsts, so many in fact, that it’s not clear that there are any 
seconds. We continually do new things, some profound, some trivial. We ‘solve problems’ 
which by definition means we’re doing new things in situations we’ve never faced before. We 
write poems and improvise on the piano and devise scientific theories. We speak new utterances 
all the time … When you look closely enough, behaviour that appears to be repeated proves to 
be novel in some fashion … Even if you managed to repeat the same response precisely, it 
would still be novel in the sense that each occurrence is the product of a changed organism. 
Epstein’s analysis reveals that in some sense all things are novel. This begs the 
question: Can novelty be used to differentiate creativity? Creativity researchers, when 
describing how some unique combinations of events and things are considered 
creative novelty, such as Albert Einstein’s contributions, while other combinations are 
considered meaningless or mundane forms of novelty, such as the next time I wash 
my hands, inevitably struggle. The frequently provided answer is a pragmatic one. It 
is argued that true creative novelty needs to be valuable, and judged as such, by an 
appropriate group of observers; hence, the reliance on recognition.  
The current alternative, to accept a form of ex nihilo creation in creative novelty, 
seems equally problematic. Some creativity researchers  claim that novelty 25
inevitably contains the presupposition of ex nihilo creation. They argue that for a 
thing to come into existence and be classed as truly novel it must, in some sense, not 
 For a discussion of this see Frank Barron, Creative Person, Creative Process (London: 23
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).
 Robert Epstein, ‘Skinner, creativity and the problem of spontaneous behaviour’, 24
Psychological Science 2(6) (1991): 362.
 See: Boden, The Creative Mind and David Perkins, ‘Creativity: beyond the Darwinian 25
paradigm’, in Dimensions of Creativity, ed. Margaret Boden (London: Bradford Books, 
1994).
have had any previous existence. David Perkins  argues that in order for us to 26
understand creativity we must also explain how creative novelty can come into 
existence from nothing. He argues that ex nihilo creation is possible: we know that 
such moments of novelty occur, therefore they must be possible. However, this does 
not explain ex nihilo novelty; what is missing is a non-contradictory commentary on 
how it is possible.  
Margaret Boden  (pace Perkins) argues that we believe creativity (defined as the 27
recognised production of valued novelty) is real because we experience it in practise, 
although theoretically and conceptually it seems impossible because of the ex nihilo 
issue surrounding novelty. She claims that the task for creativity researchers is 
therefore to explain novelty and creativity without referring to miracles. Boden’s 
solution to this ‘magic’ is to claim that genuine creativity has to be in some way 
previously impossible (as ex nihilo creation also seems impossible). She therefore 
proposes that a new idea must have been incapable of being produced before it 
happened; that it quite simply could not have occurred. She explains how this can 
happen by claiming that a merely novel idea is one that is produced by the same set of 
generative rules as are other, familiar ideas. A radically original idea, in her definition 
a creative one, is one that could not be, and it would be considered surprising or even 
shocking to those who recognise it. She labels the first form of creativity exploring a 
conceptual space, and the second going beyond the conceptual space.  28
Boden’s work is widely recognised within creativity research as advancing our 
understanding of the processes of the mind associated with creativity. However, the 
solution to ex nihilo creation proposed is arguably incomplete. First, she claims that, 
as ex nihilo is impossible, if you can explain prior impossibility of ideas, then you 
also explain the impossibility of ex nihilo creation. This is a ‘sleight of hand solution’ 
to borrow a phrase from magicians. Many things share the features of impossibility,  29
and to solve one of them does not necessarily mean that you solve the others. Second, 
even if we accept that ex nihilo creation and prior impossibility share the same 
features, if an idea genuinely could not have been produced it must not be capable of 
production. If it subsequently does happen, then it can not be considered to have been 
impossible in the first place. There is of course a temporal dimension to this, some 
ideas only become possible when social preconditions are suitable but even within 
those constraints, if an idea does occur it could not have been a prior impossibility. 
 David Perkins, ‘The possibility of invention’, in The Nature of Creativity, ed. Sternberg, 26
362-85. 
 Boden, The Creative Mind.27
 Ibid., 51.28
 There is no need to discuss the nature of impossibility within this argument.  For a useful 29
overview of these arguments referred to above, see John Barrow, Impossibility: The Limits 
of Science and the Science of Limits (Oxford University Press 1998).
The fact that it surprises or shocks the recipients of the idea,  or that it goes beyond 30
the conceptual space she described, does not overcome this. The idea simply could 
not have been impossible in the first place. Therefore her work does not offer a 
complete solution to the ex nihilo problem. Whether de novo or ex nihilo, definitions 
of creativity that contain the concept of novelty are problematic. Dealing with these 
issues through empirical investigation and subsequent theorising has so far failed to 
offer a resolution. A deeper engagement with philosophy of science may therefore 
prove fruitful in the search for a sustainable and non-contradictory creativity 
definition. 
Critical Realism and Creativity  
Rather than engage a critique of the philosophies of science underpinning existing 
creativity research, I will attempt to show how critical realism can provide an 
alternative meta-theory for creativity researchers. In doing so, the relationship 
between creativity and the recognition of creativity will be explored and an ontology 
of creativity, consistent with critical realism, proposed. It will be suggested that the 
ontological commitments of critical realism, namely the conceptions of causal 
powers, the stratification of reality and conceptions of absence enable a definition of 
creativity that may resolve the highlighted problems with the concept of novelty and 
explain how creativity is both independent of recognition and related to it. 
Critical realism contains a distinct notion of causality which provides the basis for 
claims of the existence of the world independently of our knowledge of it, or in terms 
of definitions of creativity, of our recognition of the creative act. This notion of 
causality is also distinct from conceptions of causality underpinning a great deal of 
the psychological theories of creativity, especially those theories rooted in positivism 
and empiricism whereby, in general terms, causality is seen as synonymous with 
regularity between events. So if event x and event y are regularly conjoined, it is 
presumed that one causes the other.  
Bhaskar  rejects this notion of causality and argues that the concept of causal powers 31
is more consistent with the ontology of the natural and social world. He argues that 
the real basis of causality lies in the independence of the generative mechanisms from 
the events they generate and that mechanisms endure when not acting. It is therefore 
commonly argued that the causal power of something, for example gunpowder, exists 
as a result of its necessary internal relations, its essential qualities. These qualities are 
dependent upon external relations for them to be exercised but these external relations 
are contingent – on the presence of a spark for gunpowder to explode.  
 There is a reductio ad absurdum in her logic which goes as follows:  the more surprised 30
we are by creativity, the more creative it is. The less intelligent we are, the more likely we 
are to be surprised, subsequently, the less intelligent we become, the more creativity is 
possible.
 Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary 31
Human Sciences [PON] (London: Routledge 1998). 
This means that for Bhaskar ‘whilst the positivist (Humean) tradition is correct to 
stress there are causal laws, generalities at work … it errs in the reduction of these 
laws to empirical regularities’.  In other words, relying solely on the co-variation of 32
observed events to establish and then explain causality contains an ontological error; 
it assumes that the world has the same properties as the way we come to know the 
world. These insights enable Bhaskar to claim that reality can be considered stratified 
into the levels of the real, the actual and the empirical. He states that ‘there is a 
distinction between the real structures and mechanisms of the world and the actual 
patterns of events they generate’  and that these mechanisms and events can exist 33
beyond our empirical perception. In terms of human potential this subsequently 
enables Bhaskar to recognise that we have real capacities (the potential to develop 
certain skills and competencies) and capabilities (developed skills and competencies). 
Language use provides a good example of the explanatory power of this ontological 
position. When speaking, the capability to use speech becomes observable and 
audible and therefore enters the actual and empirical level of reality but it also still 
exists at the level of real, as it is still a real capability. When not speaking, the 
capability to speak remains but it now exists at the level the real only; it is a real 
capability not in use. The capacity for human beings to learn language demonstrates 
the depth within the category of the real. This capacity exists only in potential at birth 
as the capability to use language has not developed. This conception of stratification 
enables theories informed by critical realism to consider not only that which is 
observed (and therefore open to recognition) but also other forms of potential such as 
capacities and capabilities, and their modes of operation. When applied to creativity 
this suggests that creative potential can exist at three levels: as a real potential, or 
capacity; as an acquired capability that is currently unexercised; and as a capability 
exercised but not available to the empirical observation of others.  Hence, critical 34
realism enables us to consider aspects of creativity that exist prior to recognition, 
suggesting that a definition that encompasses these characteristics is necessary.  
Whilst critical realism seems to give us the ability to consider creativity prior to its 
recognition, the question of the status of novelty and whether it is ex nihilo or de novo 
remains. As it is difficult, if not impossible, to explore ex nihilo creation empirically, 
we are reliant on philosophical enquiry to examine its possibility. Bhaskar’s Dialectic: 
The Pulse of Freedom  provides a useful base from which to explore this issue as it 35
provides a sophisticated understanding of absence. To explain ex nihilo creation one 
must also explain the existence of the nothing that is presupposed by it. In Dialectic, 
 Bhaskar, PON, 21.32
 Roy Bhaskar, ‘Philosophy and scientific realism’, in Critical Realism: Essential Readings, 33
eds M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A. Collier, T. Lawson, and A. Norrie (London: Routledge 1998), 34
 A fourth level will be developed and explained below.34
 Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom [DPF] (London: Verso 1993).35
whilst arguing against forms of actualism, Bhaskar recognises that the possibility of 
absolute nothing cannot be ruled out a priori: 
This being granted takes me to my fourth argument against the ontological dominance of the 
positive. If a totally positive material object world – a packed world without absences – is 
impossible, there is no a priori reason to exclude the opposite – namely a total void, literally 
nothing.   36
Now, employing a strategy of dialectical detachment from our initial premise – positive 
existence – in the metacritical end game, we can argue that not only is a total void possible but 
if there was a unique beginning to everything it could only be from nothing by an act of radical 
autogenesis. So that if there was an originating Absolute, nothing would be its schema or form, 
constituted at the moment of initiation by the spontaneous disposition to become something 
other than itself. Similarly, if there was a complete end to everything it would involve a collapse 
to actualised nothingness, absolutely nothing. In sum, complete positivity is impossible but 
sheer indeterminate negativity is not.  37
The existence of nothing described here is unproblematic in the sense of a theoretical 
collapse into actualised nothingness. This seems logically consistent, if that 
nothingness included the end of all potential also. However, when exploring the 
argument for radical autogenesis as the start of all things, Bhaskar recognises that this 
originating nothing would also require the ‘spontaneous disposition to become 
something other than itself’. This position implies that creation from an originating 
Absolute requires a potential in the form of a spontaneous disposition.  
To argue for autogenesis from nothing, or ex nihilo creation, is also to argue that the 
potential for the creation of that something did not pre-exist it. If the pre-existing 
‘nothing’ does not contain a potential, then the subsequent existence of this something 
(out of nothing) would contradict the critical realist interpretation of the natural and 
social world.  If it does contain a potential, as Bhaskar posits in his analysis, then ex 38
nihilo creation is not possible, as the originating nothing is in fact something, a 
potential. The creation of a new thing must therefore presuppose the potential for it. 
Generalising this analysis to definitions of creativity, it is clear that ex nihilo 
creativity is inconsistent with the principles of critical realism, as a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for creativity to occur must include the potential for it to occur, 
hence creation from something, not nothing.  
 Ibid., 46.36
 Ibid., 46–7.37
 See Mervyn Hartwig, ‘Creativity’, in Dictionary of Critical Realism, ed. M. Hartwig 38
(London: Routledge, 2007), 86-9.
An augmented definition of creativity 
This review of difficulties associated with the conventional definition of creativity has 
demonstrated a struggle to resolve what Boden and Perkins class as the paradox of 
novelty and creation. It suggests that definitions of creativity have relied, in some 
way, on references to the production of novelty that is valuable, useful, appropriate 
and recognised by some group or other. This has become the standard and most 
popular form of definition within psychological research on creativity, in many cases 
it would seem without much reflection.  39
Consequently, creativity is deemed to be reliant on the judgment of others for its 
existence, whether through its recognition in human acts or via a judgement of the 
value of a creative product. By implicitly and explicitly requiring reliance on 
recognition, the conventional definition is incompatible with some facets of creativity 
that are prior to recognition, such as creative potential and particularly unrecognised 
creativity. The problem with this reliance on recognition is that it commits the 
epistemic fallacy; it defines reality through how we come to know it and is therefore 
both conceptually flawed and inconsistent with the way the world is, according to the 
principles of critical realism. This also introduces inconsistency into psychological 
accounts of creativity. In order for research on unrecognised creativity and creative 
potential to proceed, an augmented definition of creativity is necessary.  
Before offering such a definition of creativity, it is necessary to explore existing 
accounts of creativity informed through critical realism to examine whether these 
issues have already been fully resolved. In Mervyn Hartwig’s Dictionary of Critical 
Realism  an overview of critical realist thinking is provided and the definition of 40
creativity offered is ‘the capacity to produce something new and valuable’. The term 
capacity in the definition means that existing critical realist accounts of creativity 
view it first and foremost as a potential. The process by which creativity occurs is also 
explained and here there is also a rejection of ontological ex nihilo creation through 
the recognition that creativity involves emergence from an ‘implicit or enfolded 
potential’.  This reflects Bhaskar’s main work on creativity  in which he defines 41 42
creativity first as the production of something new  and then recognises that this 43
‘newness’ emerges from what was implicitly in potential beforehand. Hence, he too 
rejects ex nihilo creation considered from an ontological point of view.  
 For a review of the lack of reflection on definitions in journal articles see Jonathon 39
Plucker and Ronald Beghetto, ‘Why creativity is domain general, why it looks domain 
specific and why the distinction doesn’t matter’, in Creativity: From Potential to 
Realisation, eds Robert Sternberg, Elena Grigorenko, and Jerome Singer (London: American 
Psychological Society, 2006). 154-168
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As we have seen, the concept of novelty is problematic. Critical realism seems to 
enable a definition of creativity to include ‘valuable novelty’ as the presupposition of 
ex nihilo creation can be dealt with. However, there is still the de novo issue to 
contend with. Some new things or moments can meet the criteria of this definition but 
may not be the result of a capacity for creativity. For example, and I know it’s trivial, 
making a cup of tea. It’s a novel moment, the precise combination of events that 
results in the end product – a cup of tea – would not have previously occurred in 
exactly the same way and the end product would be unique and valuable. Bhaskar 
recognises the ex nihilo problem but the use of novelty and value in a definition of 
creativity requires further exploration for it to be sustainable. The missing link 
between the emergence of these new phenomena and a consistent definition of 
creativity must therefore be supplied. I argue that the moment of discovery Bhaskar 
refers to later in his work,  when expanded upon, can hold the key to reconciling 44
these underlying issues with a definition of creativity that accepts that the emergence 
of creative novelty can occur. Utilising the meta-theoretical insights of critical realism 
and drawing upon some of the ideas captured in the existing psychological literature 
on creativity, I therefore offer the following definitions, which build sequentially to an 
overall definition. Each component of the definition is first presented and then 
explained.  
Human creativity is the capacity to discover the causal powers of the world. 
This first clause of the definition provides an overarching account of all forms of 
human creativity and as such can refer to creativity as a personal capacity for 
moments of discovery, whether of local or historical significance. It is therefore 
consistent with this definition to recognise Boden’s  contribution to the 45
understanding of creativity and accept that personal and historical creativity have 
different outcomes by adding: 
These discoveries can occur for the first time in human history or for the first 
time in relation to the individual or individuals concerned. 
This recognises the importance society places on historical and radically new 
contributions but does not reduce creativity to such contributions. It also reconciles 
the ex nihilo issue of novelty as it recognises that a thing can be discovered for the 
first time but that it will also pre-exist the discovery, either in potential or otherwise. 
Likewise the inclusion of discovery enables the emergence of creative novelty to be 
differentiated from other novel moments or things and therefore overcomes the 
problem of de novo novelty. Finally, it is possible to acknowledge the role personal 
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and societal recognition plays  in the uptake of creativity and therefore make the 46
following addition: 
These discoveries may (or may not) be recognised by the individual and 
subsequently communicated. If recognised and communicated they may (or 
may not) gain individual, group, organisational, community or global 
recognition and this process of recognition can be influenced by many factors 
including (but not limited to) economic, political and power processes. 
This allows that personal recognition of creativity does not always occur, as the 
importance of some discoveries can remain hidden to those who discover them. If it is 
personally recognised and communicated, the discovery can go on to gain wider 
recognition (or not). This process of recognition includes the need for communication 
and can be influenced by many factors. Having proposed a new definition of 
creativity, a detailed explanation of each component will be offered in turn whilst 
demonstrating both the usefulness of critical realism and the potential of this 
definition to solve the tensions identified within the existing conceptual framework 
for creativity. 
Creativity is the human capacity … 
Critical realism holds that causality refers to the power or capacity of a thing to act. 
This power can have both internal relations (the essential properties of a thing), and 
external contingent relations with other causal powers operating on and around it. In 
agreement with Bhaskar, we can therefore claim that creativity in the social sphere is 
first and foremost a human capacity. One can recognise the enabling and constraining 
effects of society on these capacities and capabilities, but creativity ought not to be 
reduced merely to the existence of these effects, such as those produced by processes 
of recognition. One can also recognise that human creativity is dependent upon a 
world in which discoveries are possible, and that non-human systems can be creative 
(such as nature’s creativity in processes of evolution). However, the human capacity 
for creativity resides both within our own capacities and capabilities for making such 
discoveries (for example, our powers of imagination, problem solving, ideation, 
insight, combinational thinking, language and rational thinking) and in the nature of 
the world around us that lends itself to discovery.  
Once we accept that creativity is a human capacity, theory can begin to explicitly 
uncover these human powers and capacities for creativity, how they operate and 
interact, what is crucial to their development and how they can best be actualised. 
Whilst explanation in theory is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible to 
theorise about the human capacity for creativity at a number of levels: 
1. As a power or capacity in potential 
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2. As a power or capacity that is realised (a capability) but not necessarily 
exercised 
3. As a capability that is exercised but does not necessarily result in a discovery 
4. As a capability that is exercised and results in a discovery 
Level (1) refers to the existence of creative potential as a latent skill or ability. 
Level (2) recognises that even if this capacity is realised as a capability we may 
choose, or be forced, not to use it. Level (3) allows for a realised capability to be 
used ineffectively due to countervailing powers in the environment and the self, 
which prevent discovery. Level (4) refers to the moment of discovery, which can 
still be unrecognised and therefore still exists as a form of potential, or latent 
creativity. The role of theory is, at least in part, to explain each of these levels and 
offer explanation of the interactions between them. 
To make discoveries about the causal powers of the world … 
The second fundamental feature of human creativity is that it requires a moment of 
discovery. In nature and other material systems creativity can be seen as a process of 
emergence that does not necessarily require a conscious discovery.  For human 47
beings, the emergence of something new must also, in some way, include a moment 
of discovery in human consciousness. This offers a resolution to the ex nihilo paradox 
as it suggests that in human creativity the discovery emerges from something pre-
existing, not from nothing. Therefore we must engage in a process of discovery 
whereby we aid the potential for something to unfold or become manifest and, either 
simultaneously or later, become conscious of it. Bhaskar recognises the need for this 
moment of discovery in his work on creativity  but this can now be developed further 48
to explore the significance of discovery for a definition of creativity. Hence, this 
definition suggests the capacity to discover rather than the capacity to produce 
novelty becomes a central defining feature of creativity. 
Defining creativity as the capacity for discovery provides both a sustainable 
resolution to the ex nihilo paradox of novelty and circumvents the need to reduce 
creativity definitions to the recognition and value of the creative act. It also enables us 
to consider that creativity involves the discovery of capacities (powers in potential), 
as well as capabilities (realised powers). Consequently, this gives us the ability to 
classify several types of human discovery: 
1. The discovery of a capacity or potential (a causal power in its potential state) 
2. The discovery of a realised capability that is not necessarily exercised  
3. The discovery of a realised and exercised capability, the effects of which are 
countervailed by other causal powers 
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4. The discovery of a realised and exercised capability, the effects of which were 
previously oblique to human understanding 
Some examples may help with distinguishing theses types of discovery.  (1) refers to 
the discovery of things like the (powers of the) motor car; its capacities were 
unrealised until the combination of other powers enabled it to be discovered (for 
example, the discovery of the power of petrol to combust, the strength of steel and so 
on). (2) refers to the ability to discover a hidden capacity such as the ability of a 
material to conduct electricity. Its capacity can be viewed as realised (that is, as a 
capability), but only exercised when it comes into contact with an electrical current. 
(3) might refer to the power of aspirin to reduce heart disease. In its early use as a 
painkiller, this capability was countervailed as it was not used consistently enough for 
its powers to fully operationalise. (4) refers to such things as the ability to explain 
gravity. The power of gravity is realised and its effects are physically apparent but its 
essential properties were oblique to the understanding of humans for large parts of 
history; the power of gravity is therefore revealed to human understanding.  
This framework also has some applicability to creativity in art. Whilst a complex 
process, when an artist develops a painting that is subsequently enjoyed by an 
audience, they have also discovered the capability of that precise combination of 
things to influence an audience. This capability must have existed as a potential or 
capacity prior to its development, hence the requirement for the human mind to have a 
moment or moments of discovery. For example, the capability of human beings to 
enjoy impressionist art could be predicated upon the capacity and capability of human 
beings to recognise patterns in incomplete and complex perceptual information. This 
by no means limits or reduces the process of making art to a simple explanation, it 
merely highlights some of the common underlying features within such creative 
processes.  
Just as the object of enquiry can determine the method of investigation, these objects 
of discovery have properties that may require very different human capacities for 
them to be discovered. For example, discovering a capacity or potential might require 
the capacity for imagination, whereas understanding the power of gravity may require 
the capacity for abstraction and reasoned argument.  This also presupposes that 49
environments contain powers that enable or constrain certain forms of creativity. In 
the case of discovering that metal conducts electricity, it is first necessary for the 
environment to have an actualised power of electricity within it (amongst many other 
things) in order for the discovery to be possible.  
I have no doubt that there are many more possible categories of discovery and further 
research is required to offer a deeper understanding than provided here. However, my 
account begins the process of distinguishing between the various types of discovery 
that creativity can refer to. There is a history in the dominant conceptual framework 
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highlight that human beings have many capacities.
of considering discovery part of creativity.  However, the conventional definition 50
with its focus on the recognised production of novelty has relegated the role of 
discovery to something of an afterthought. This definition suggests that discovery is 
central to any definition of creativity. 
For the first time in human history … or for the first time to the individual … 
Knowing that something is of historical importance may indeed rely upon the 
agreement of relevant groups of people, but it is important to separate that process of 
agreement from the thing that is being agreed upon. In agreement with Bhaskar  and 51
Boden,  this definition suggests that the capacity for creativity is a universal feature 52
of human beings and that re-discoveries are as much a feature of creativity as first-
time historically significant discoveries. There might, however, be a difference in the 
level of difficulty of the relative discoveries.  Discovering the potential of water to 53
turn to steam may be a creative discovery for a six-year-old in a primary science class, 
but may be considered different in the degree of difficulty to the task a scientist faces 
in attempting to discover the nature of quantum particles. This difference in degree of 
difficulty has previously led researchers to claim that historical and personal creativity 
are different types of creativity, in the absence of the necessary ontological toolkit to 
explain exactly how they are different, or how they might be the same.  
My augmented definition gives researchers the ability to theorise about the nature of 
creativity by explaining which human capacities and capabilities are required, the 
nature of the discovery, and what enabling and constraining powers are in effect in the 
environment, with each variable being critical to the success of the creative project. 
One might suggest that the discovery of the boiling point of water by a six-year-old 
involves a simple discovery as there are many enabling powers available to aid the 
discovery and few of the human powers for creativity need to be in operation.  54
Likewise, the discovery of gravity could once have been a difficult discovery. Armed 
with this framework, theory can seek to understand the conditions that enable and 
constrain creative discoveries in societies, organisations, groups and individuals. 
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 See e.g. Howard Gruber, ‘The evolving systems approach to creative work’, in Creative 53
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 Although it could equally be argued that it is a difficult discovery precisely because many 54
of the necessary reasoning capabilities are unrealised at age six. Either way, a method of 
ascertaining developmental individual differences becomes possible.
These discoveries may (or may not) be recognised by the individual … 
Some discoveries have occurred the significance of which has been misunderstood by 
their discoverers. Contemporary folklore suggests that Edison thought the telephone 
would only be of limited use, and inventors at IBM did not think there was a viable 
market for computers. By recognising this in defining creativity it enables researchers 
to explore what it is in the relationship between discoverer, discovered and society 
that can prevent the powers of a thing from being recognised as important. 
Or gain … recognition … 
Exploration of just how recognition occurs is important to the understanding of 
creativity. Recognition is a personal and social process and includes individual, group, 
organisational, community and possibly global processes. The study of recognition as 
it relates to creativity is both important to our understanding of creativity and yet 
distinct from it. Personal creativity is not reliant on recognition but the power of 
creativity to affect change requires recognition. It can involve many processes not 
necessarily directly involved with creativity itself, such as psychological conditions,  55
communication skills and, perhaps most importantly within the organisational setting, 
power and political influences. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was not to explain creativity but to provide some meta-
theoretical ground clearing or underlabouring to establish a definition of creativity 
that is both consistent with humanist thought and critical realism. Through exploring 
the issues of recognition and novelty within the dominant conceptual framework and 
drawing upon the ontology of critical realism, it has been proposed, in agreement with 
Bhaskar, that creativity should first and foremost be considered a universal human 
capacity, a definition which, when linked to discovery, enables the resolution of issues 
within the dominant conceptual framework. It is not without precedent to define 
creativity as a potential but rarely has discovery been placed at the heart of the 
definition. For example, in a recent review of how to improve creativity there was 
little explicit mention of the role of discovery.  Using critical realism to inform 56
research on creativity suggests that discovery should be not considered a relatively 
insigificant aspect of creativity but one of its central defining features.  
 E.g. Kasof’s seminal piece: Joseph Kasof, ‘Explaining creativity: the attributional 55
perspective’, Creativity Research Journal 8(4) (1995): 311-66.
 Raymond Nickerson, ‘Enhancing Creativity’, in Handbook of Creativity, ed. Sternberg, 56
(Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 392-430. 
This paper also explored the depth of creative potential that critical realism enables us 
to theorise, in a consistent and sustainable way. This is extremely important as 
humanist thought presupposes the existence of such latent capacities in workers. 
However, rather than develop an explanation of creativity and how it emerges, I 
would like to speculate, for now, on the political consequences of this paper.  
If creativity can exist as a potential, unrecognised, unexercised and unrealised, then 
the fact that we rarely see creative activity displayed in contemporary organisations 
should not (mis)lead us into believing that millions of people simply lack creative 
potential. Such misleading ideas fuel policies aiming to make intellectual education 
available only to those deemed to be ‘creative’ and vocational education available to 
those deemed to lack creative potential. Rejecting these deceptive ideas should lead us 
to ask far more searching questions, not just of people qua agents, but of the class, 
gender, and race-based social structures, institutions and organisations with which 
people find themselves interacting.  
If people are potentially creative, future research should enquire what it is about these 
social structures, institutions and organisations that not only prevent workers’ creative 
powers being realised and exercised, but also prevent their exercised and realised 
creative action from being recognised. This clearly means that issues of politics and 
power need addressing. The effect of these constraining factors is not, of course, a 
new discovery. Organisational theory is littered with accounts  of the negative effect 57
of management control on employee performance and motivation. Nevertheless, 
critical realism provides the wherewithal to explore the consequences of these barriers 
to creativity, enabling unrecognised and unrealised creativity to be considered real, as 
well as providing a means for studying types of creative potential. This means we can 
begin to seek out the creativity, not only the few, but of the many. Until such time as 
access to wealth, resources and their subsequent power and political advantages are 
proven not to hinder creative potential, the position of assuming that all members of 
the population who do not display creativity do not have any creative potential should 
perhaps be abandoned. A deeper explanation of exactly how creative potential can fail 
to be realised is very necessary indeed. 
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